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Abstract
This paper examines determinants of child labor and schooling with a
special emphasis on birth order and sibling age structure. We present a the-
oretical model accounting for the dynamics of birth order and its interaction
with credit constraints. We show that poor - credit-constrained - parents
send their elder children to work relatively more. Since rst borns are the
only available source of additional income when constraints on resources be-
come more binding, they work more and end up with a lower level of human
capital compared to their younger siblings. On the other hand, wealthier par-
ents do not discriminate between their children on the basis of birth order.
We test these predictions on the 2001 Cameroon Household Survey database.
Controlling for household xed e¤ects, gender and age, our results conrm
that later-born childrens educational levels are relatively higher. Wealthier
households do not make use of birth order to discriminate between childrens
education levels. These results are robust to various measures of the birth
order.
JEL Classications: C23, D13, I29, O12
Keywords: Education, Birth Order, Child Labor
The authors are grateful to Jean-Marie Baland, Frédéric Gaspart and Vincenzo Verardi for
helpful comments. They would also like to thank Clive Bell, Matthieu Delpierre, Sébastien
Laurent, François Maniquet, Rohini Somanathan, Eric Verhoogen and seminar participants at
CORE, ECRU UCL, University of Girona, University of Namur, the Oxford CSAE meeting and
University of Saint Louis.
yUniversity of Namur, CRED. Email: michel.tenikue@fundp.ac.be
zUniversity of Namur, FNRS research fellow. Email: bertrand.verheyden@fundp.ac.be
1
1 Introduction
In developing countries, the number of children in poor households may tighten
constraints on intra-household allocation of resources (Garg and Morduch, 1998)
[13]. A competition between children for available resources is likely to result from
such constraints. This competition can express itself by a discrimination between
children on the basis of nutrition or health care (Behrman, 1988) [3]. Another
dimension of intra-houshold discrimination regards the access to schooling and
child labor (Basu & Van, 1998) [2]. If resources become scarce, parents may send
some of children to work and others to attend school and concentrate on studying.
Economics research on the determinants of this discrimination in the domain
of child labor and school attendance are vivid. Yet, the question of what factors
a¤ect householdsdecision to send a child to the labor market or to school is not
fully elaborated. The specialization of children based on gender or "gender bias",
has been observed in a large empirical literature on child labor and schooling in
African countries (Dar et al, 2000) [7]. It is observed that girls are less likely to
attend school than boys. In this paper, we investigate the potential role of birth
order in this specialization process. The underlying question we want to study is
whether birth order may be a factor through which this discrimination between
children arises, and if so, in favor of which child ?
The role of the birth order has been investigated in several studies. Until
recently, the common view in the empirical literature was that parents invest more
in the education of the rst child. Several arguments support this conclusion. The
fact - which has been pointed out by the psychological literature - that earlier born
children have higher IQs and cognitive abilities is one of them.1 The economic
implication of this fact is that parents may want to invest more resources in the
education of the child with the greatest return to education. The hypothesis that
birth order may a¤ect parentsallocation choices also stems from the fact that
rst born children are favored for cultural factors (Horton, 1988) [14]. Because
parents need security in old age, they will invest more in the education of the rst
born children because they will become economically independent rst.
In recent theoretical and empirical contributions, this view is being challenged:
later born children seem to be favored (more educated) than earlier born children.
Ejrnaes & Pörtner (2004) [10] claim that this new conclusion can be reached once
the endogeneity of fertility choices is properly taken into account. The theory they
present to back up this result is based on a combination of uncertainty about the
ability of the children to be born and the taste of parents for their o¤springs
human capital and their aversion for inequality between children. The intuition is
the following: since the stopping rule (on the decision of having children) depends
on the last childs potential return to education, last born children are more likely
to be successful at school.
In this paper, we formalize the idea that when parents are credit constrained,
they can be forced to send their ealier born children to work. Our model accounts
explicitly for the dynamics of birth order and shows how the latter interacts with
credit constraints. Apart from being born (and as a result becoming productive)
1Zajonc (1976) [17].
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at di¤erent moments, all children have the same potential return to education and
labor productivity. The importance of taking into account a dynamic perspective
over the household is that it highlights a simple fact: di¤erent periods are char-
acterized by di¤erent family sizes, di¤erent levels of pressure over resources and
di¤erent numbers of potential child laborers.2 The dynamic perspective is also im-
portant in the sense that the choice of discriminating one child in one period has
repercussions over the next periods. The intuition behind our result is that when
the pressure on household budget becomes very tight, that is when all children are
born, only earlier born children can be sent to work to generate additional income
and soften budget constraints.3 Our results can be stated in the following way.
As long as a households optimal savings are strictly positive, i.e. it is not credit
constrained, all children receive the same education level. On the other hand, if a
household faces credit constraints the rstborn child works more and receives less
education than her younger sibling. The latter ends up with a higher level of hu-
man capital. The main prediction of our model is that in "poor" households (that
are credit-constrained), the elder children end up with a relatively lower level of
human capital and "rich" households do not discriminate between their children
on the basis of birth order and all children reach the same human capital level.
To our knowledge, our model is the rst one to take explicitly into account
the order of birth and to show how it interacts with credit constraints. Papers by
Emerson & Souza (2002) [11] and Edmonds (2006) [9] have studied this question
both theoretically and empirically and reach the same conclusions as Ejrnaes &
Pörtner (2004) [10]. These two papers study households behaviour in a static
context where children potentially di¤er in innate ability and labor productivity.4
Implicitly, birth order is represented through these two characteristics. This mod-
elling strategy generates general arbitrage conditions on the optimal allocation of
schooling and child labor on the basis of innate ability and productivity, but fails
to identify explicitly the role of birth order. For instance, it neither incorporates
the fact that each child is born at di¤erent moments and becomes productive in
di¤erent economic environments, nor shows how credit constraints play a role in
this precise context.
We test the models predictions on the 2001 Cameroon Household Survey data-
base. Our empirical strategy is to analyse the stock of human capital rather than a
short term information about whether he/she is registered in a school on the year
of the survey. Our dependant variable is an "educational zscore" which compares
the number of completed grades of a child to the median of all children of the same
age. Controlling for household xed e¤ects, gender and age, our results conrm
2Very young children (under 6 for instance) cannot be sent to work.
3To see this, let us use a representative household in Cameroon. The average household has
4 children, with 2 years separating each of them. When the rst born child is 6 years old, all
4 children are in the household, meaning that the pressure on resources is at its maximum. It
would take 2 more years to wait and send the second born to work, 4 years for the third born,...
4 In our model, some children are not productive in some periods, while their elder siblings are.
However, the papers we refer to are focusing on periods where all children are potential workers.
In our model, in such periods, all children have the same productivity and return to education.
Furthermore, in the last periods, the productivity of elder children becomes nil since they leave
the household, while younger siblings are still productive. In other words, the productivity of
children is globally the same over all periods.
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that later-born childrens educational levels are relatively higher. Furthermore, we
observe no discrimination within wealthier households. These results are robust
to alternative denitions of birth order, indicators of wealth, and other robustness
checks.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a simple model in which
households allocate labor and education between children born at di¤erent periods.
In Section 3, we present the data, including our measures of birth order and the
empirical model. Estimation results and their interpretations follow in Section 4.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
The household is composed of one parent and two children i 2 f1; 2g.5 The parent
lives for 2 periods p 2 f1; 2g and there is no discounting of the future by any agent.
Children live two periods -childhood and adolescence- inside the household, then
become adults and leave it. During her rst period in the household, a child is
fully dependant, i.e. she can neither study nor work. In her second period in the
household however, the child becomes -what we call- an adolescent and is endowed
with one unit of productive time that parents decide to allocate between labor li
and schooling ei = 1  li. Children leave the household at the end of adolescence.
When inside the household, child i consumes k units of the numeraire good at
each period. Parents supply their own labor inelastically and parental labor has
y e¢ ciency units in each period, while child labor productivity is constant and
equal to 1. Child labor revenues contribute to household income. The timing of
our model is the following: at period 1, child 1 is already an adolescent while child
2 is still in childhood. Child 1 leaves the household at the end of period 1. At
period 2, child 2 becomes an adolescent. At the end of period 2, child 2 leaves the
household and the parent dies.
Adult children earnings depend on the acquired level of human capital through the
time spent at school. The human capital technology is denoted H(e) : [0; 1]! R+.
We will use extensively the following notations: Hi  H(ei), H 0i 
@H(e)
@e jei for all
i 2 f1; 2g. Children who spent all their childhood working have a single e¢ ciency
unit of labor as an adult: H(0) = 1. The marginal return to schooling time
is strictly positive (H 0 > 0) and strictly decreasing (H 00 < 0). The adult childs
incomeW (H) = H allows her to consumeH units of the numeraire good. Child is
utility is noted V (Hi). Parental utility is denoted (c1; c2; V (H1); V (H2)) where
c1 and c2 are parental consumption levels for respectively periods 1 and 2.  is
assumed separable so that
(c1; c2; V1; V2) = U(c1) + U(c2) +  (V (H1) + V (H2)) ; (1)
where both U() and V () are continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing, strictly
concave functions and  2 [0; 1] is a parameter measuring parental altruism to-
wards children. Again, we will make use of the following notations: Up  U(cp),
U 0p 
@U(c)




@H jHi for all i 2 f1; 2g.
5 In this simple version of the model, we consider the number of children as exogenous.
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Apart from choosing their childrens labor times li for all i 2 f1; 2g, parents decide
whether to transfer income across periods through savings s. Capital markets are
imperfect, so that savings are non negative. Parents start period 1 with an exoge-
nous initial wealth level W coming from previous savings or bequests. Therefore,
they face the following budget constraints:
c1 = y + l1   2k +W   s; (2)
c2 = y + l2   k + s: (3)
We assume that there exist interior optimum levels of child labour l1, l2 for which
the rst order conditions are respectively:










The rst order conditions with respect to s is:
U 01 = U
0
2 and s > 0 or (6)
U 01 > U
0
2 and s = 0: (7)
The optimal level of savings is l1 l2+W k2 . Therefore, savings will be interior only
if W and/or child discrimination at the expense of the rst born are su¢ ciently
large.
Proposition 1 If household wealth is su¢ ciently high (W > k), s is interior and
birth order does not a¤ect schooling and child labor decisions. Children receive
the same level of education: e1 = e2. If on the contrary, household wealth is too
low (W  k), birth order does a¤ect schooling and child labor decisions. The
rst born child receives less education than the second born: e1 < e2. However,
child discrimination tends to decrease as wealth increases and the need for liquidity
decreases: at equilibrium, e2   e1 < k  W .
Proof. Let us start by analysing the case where W > k. Let us consider three
classes of optimum candidates, namely l1 = l2, l1 > l2 and l1 < l2. We need to
show that only l1 = l2 can yield an optimal allocation.
Consider rst the case where l1 > l2. This implies that optimal savings, l1 l2+W k2 ,







Since both V () andH() are continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing, strictly
concave functions, V 0H 0(e) is a strictly decreasing function of e. Indeed, @V
0H0
@e =






2 implies that e1 = e2 and we
have a contradiction.
Consider the second case where l1 < l2. Two possibilities emerge: either l1 l2+W k2 >
0, in which case we have a contradiction for the same reasons as those shown above,
or l1 l2+W k2 < 0, which implies that savings are at a corner. In the latter sce-






2. As shown above, this inequality
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holds if and only e1 < e2, which contradicts with l1 < l2.
Finally, if l1 = l2, optimal savings, W k2 , are strictly positive. Consequently, by






2. The latter equality holds if and only if e1 = e2,
or equivalently, l1 = l2.
Let us now study the case where W  k. Again, let us consider three classes of
optimum candidates, namely l1 = l2, l1 > l2 and l1 < l2. We need to show that
only l1 > l2 can yield an optimal allocation.
Consider rst the case where l1 < l2. l1 l2+W k2 < 0, which implies that savings






2. As shown above, this
inequality holds if and only e1 < e2, which contradicts with l1 < l2.
Consider the second case where l1 = l2. Since W k2  0, savings are at a corner.
Consequently, by (7), (4) and (5), e1 > e2 and we have a contradiction.
Finally, if l1 > l2, two possibilities emerge. Either l1 l2+W k2 > 0 or less dis-
crimination at the expense of the rst born occurs so that l1 l2+W k2 < 0. If
l1 l2+W k
2 > 0, savings are interior, which by (6), (4) and (5), implies e1 = e2 and
we have a contradiction. On the contrary, if l1 l2+W k2 < 0 (which is equivalent
to e2   e1 < k  W ), savings are at a corner, which by (7), (4) and (5), implies
e1 < e2, or equivalently, l1 > l2.
The intuition behind proposition 1 is that when parents are su¢ ciently rich
so that they are not liquidity constrained in period 1, they are able to allocate
similarly the time of their two children between schooling and working. More
precisely, all children spend the same time at school and at work regardless of the
period where they are productive. When the household faces liquidity constraints,
period 1 savings are at a corner. At period 1, the pressure on resources is important
compared to period 2: in the rst one, two children consume but only one is able
to bring resources to the household, while only one child consumes at period 2.
This leads the household to make the rst born child work more.
3 The data and the empirical model
3.1 The data
We use data from the second Survey on Cameroonian Households (SCH) con-
ducted in 2001. It includes an extensive household questionnaire. The survey
was part of the "Poverty data improvement" component of a partnership project
for growth and poverty reduction established between Cameroon and the World
Bank. It consists of nearly 11,000 urban and rural households drawn to form a
representative sample of the whole country. The survey gathers information over
about 57,000 individuals. We focus on those who are aged between 6 and 18 years
old and are living in households where the eldest child is 18. This subsample
consists of 6,452 individuals from about 2,560 households.
It is important to recognize that because the data used here is based on a
household survey, it may not take into account the fact that some children may
no longer live with their parents. In our sample, the age di¤erence between two
children of consecutive birth order is in general smaller than 3 (80% of cases)
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and the median is 2, while the national median is around 2.5.6 This suggests
that the information we use to construct our birth order measures is reasonably
cleaned of measurement errors due to the phenomenon of migrating children. We
also implicitly assume that households do not have a child of more than 18 living
elsewhere. In the estimation part, we check the robustness of our results on a
subsample where households did not face migratory ows over the last 5 years.
We use three di¤erent measures of the order of birth. The rst one is a set of
dummy variables: one for the rstborn, one for the second-born and a third one
for the third-born. We use only three dummy variables because the birth order of
only 13% of children in the sample is higher or equal to 4. The second measure
is the absolute birth order (Horton, 1988) [14]. The value for the absolute birth
order of the rstborn child is one, that of the second-child is 2 and so forth. Most
of the variation in this measure is due to larger families. The third measure is
the relative birth order (Behrman, 1988) [3]. It is dened as r 1n 1 where r is the
absolute order of birth and n the number of children in the household. The relative
birth order of the rst-born is zero and that of the last-born is 1, irrespective of the
number of children.7 The relative birth order for a given child can be interpreted
as the share of elder siblings he/she has in the household.
Most children under 18 are at school. They are still in the process of accumu-
lating human capital and we do not know what would be their nal educational
attainment in the future. Hence the current level of education is not a suitable
indicator of the human capital of these children. The dependant variable in our
regression will instead be a standardized education level (zscore). This zscore of





where ELi;j is the current education level (measured by the number of completed
years of education) of a child i in household j, age is a reference education level
of children of his/her age and age measures the dispersion of the education of
children around the reference value. The zscore expresses the divergence of the
education level of a child from the median education level of children of his/her
age, standardized by a spread measure. In the nutritional status literature, inter-
national reference values are used. In our case, such reference out of sample values
are not available. Consequently, we construct these references from our data. We
choose to dene age as the median education level of children of a given age and
age as the interquartile interval of education levels of children of the same age.
Given our sample size, these values are not sensitive to the education level of a
single child.8
6>From the "Enquête Démographique et de Santé, Cameroun 2004" [8].
7This denition is more interesting because it is not sensitive to the number of children,
which may be an issue as long as the latter is considered endogenous. Birth order, or sibling
composition, is the realization of parents fertility decision and is likely to be correlated with
unobserved characteristics of the households. Indeed parents decisions on fertility, education and
child labor are simultaneously determined through a dynamic structure (Cigno & Rosati, 2000)
[6], (Baland & Robinson, 2000) [1]). In particular, Ejrnaes & Pörtner (2004) [10] study the impact
of birth order on schooling focusing on the endogeneity of fertility choices.
8A more common denition of the zscore is the diversion of the variable of interest from its
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The main prediction of Section 2 is that in poor households, rstborn chil-
dren have reached a smaller education level compared to later-borns, while this
discrimination does not occur in wealthier households. Figure (3.1) gives a rst
indicator supporting this distinction by wealth. It presents the average zscores
of children from poor and non-poor households by birth order.9 ;10 It indicates
that on average, in poor families, being among the earlier born children seems to
strongly deteriorate their education level (relative to the reference of their age),
while fourth borns and later borns do not seem to su¤er from this comparison
anymore. In richer households, this discrimination appears to be very small (the
average slope of the curve is very at, and much atter than that of poor house-
holds). Furthermore, all children from richer families appear to have signicantly
the same education level as their reference.
Figure 4: Average educational zscores by household wealth and absolute birth order.
Table (1) presents some relevant descriptive statistics of our sample.11 Households
have at most 8 children aged between 6 and 18 years. There may however be more
children inside the household, since these statistics do not take into account chil-
dren who are less than 6. The latter phenomenon explains the relatively low values
for the average absolute and relative birth orders, as well as the large proportion
of rst and second born children (respectively 0.4 and 0.3). Boys and girls are
almost represented in the same proportions. The average age is 11. The number
of completed years of education is comprised between 0 and 14, with an average
of 3.3 and a standard deviation of 2.9. The number of juniors also encompasses
the siblings below 6 years of age, with an average of 2.3. The largest household
conditional mean, standardized by its conditional standard error. The reason why we use this
alternative denition is linked to the problem of extreme values, which is potentially present
for the variable of interest in our sample. Both the median and the interquartile interval are
less sensitive to this problem than respectively the mean and the standard error. We check the
robustness of our results to this alternative zscore.
9A household is considered as "poor" if it is living below the countrys poverty line.
10This gure plots the estimated coe¢ cients of the birth order - and their 95% condence
interval - from a reduced form household xed e¤ect linear regression. The dependant variable
is the zscore and explanatory variables are dummies of birth order only.
11The number of observations related to households characteristics is the number of households
in the sample. The mean of a dummy variable represents a proportion. The dummy poor is
dened according to the poverty line of the country.
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comprises 13 children, the average is around 3.8.
We have shown in section 2 that household wealth is determinant in the deci-
sion regarding child discrimination. Empirically measuring household wealth in
developing countries is rather problematic. We proxy household wealth by the
predicted household expenditures per capita. Current expenditures per capitaIt
is households annual expenditures (housing, food, health care,...) divided by the
household size. is rst estimated as a function of a set of long term variables
including parental education, assets owned, professional activity of the parents,
and regional dummies. The tted values are then used as an independent vari-
able measuring household wealth in a behavioral household equation. This wealth
proxy is further normalized so that its value for the poorest household in the data
is zero. Finally, on the basis on the poverty line criterion, our sample is composed
of 35% of poor households.
3.2 The empirical model
The main prediction of Section 2 is that in poor households, rstborn children
have reached a smaller education level compared to later-borns, while this dis-
crimination does not occur in wealthier households. We test this prediction using
the education zscore presented in the previous subsection as dependant variable.
The specication is based on the following xed e¤ect model:
zscorei;j = BOi;j+BOi;j HWj + Ci;j + j + "i;j ; (M1)
where BOi;j is a set of three birth order dummies (rst born, second born, third
born, the reference being fourth or later born), HWj is household js indicator of
wealth and Ci;j are control variables. This normalization allows us to interpret 
as the e¤ect of birth order in the poorest household. The control variables Ci;j
are the childs age, gender and number of younger brothers and sisters. The term
j captures a household-specic xed e¤ect. It accounts for household unobserved
heterogeneity and household characteristics common to all children: parental ed-
ucation and professional activity, living area, as well as preferences on childrens
education,... The predictions of the theoretical model can be translated into the
following tests:
1. In "poor" households, rst born children reach relatively lower levels of hu-
man capital.
H0 : 1 = 0 HA : 1 < 0
where 1, the rst element of the vector , relates to the rst born child.
Under the null, being the rst born has no impact, while under the alterna-
tive, being the rst born implies a worse performance than that of a fourth
or later born.
2. As household wealth increases, the role of birth order on schooling is atten-
uated.
H0 : 1 = 0 HA : 1 > 0
Under the null, wealth does not a¤ect the impact of birth order on schooling.
9
Under the alternative, the negative e¤ect of being a rst born is attenuated
by household wealth.
We further check whether the discrimination between children is sorted ac-
cording to birth order. To say it di¤erently, does the discrimination progressively
diminish from the rst to the fourth born (1 < 2 < 3 < 0) ? Or is only the
rst born a¤ected by this discrimination (2 = 3 = 0) ?
4 Empirical results
We study the role of the order of birth on childrens educational attainments at a
given age. We present here the most important results, based on regressions using
the birth order dummies. We study the whole sample as well as distinct urban from
rural areas. Further, we check the robustness of these results in several dimensions.
In each of them, we are able to conrm the predictions of our theoretical model.
4.1 Main results
We estimate model (M1) on rural and urban households as well as on the unre-
stricted sample. Results are provided in Table 2.
The coe¢ cient on rst born is signicantly negative. This means that at a given
age, being the rst born child in a poor household makes the child perform worse
(compared to the median level of children of the same age) than if he/she were
the fourth born or more. Secondly, the coe¢ cient on the interaction term be-
tween rst born and household wealth is signicantly positive. This means that
the negative e¤ect of being the rst born is less strong as the households wealth
increases. Since HW equals 4 for the richest household, one can easily see that for
a su¢ ciently rich household, being among the rst born children no longer implies
a poorer education level. It may even imply a relatively better education level.
Interestingly, boys do not seem to have a relatively higher education level than
girls: neither the interactions with birth order nor the gender dummy are signi-
cant.
The use of age dummies allows us to make sure that our birth order e¤ects do
not incorporate an age or cohort e¤ect. These dummies are negative and signi-
cant. We interpret these values in the following way: as age increases, the mean
education level (conditional on age) increases less fast than the median education
level (conditional on age). This is because, as time passes, risks of drop out or
failure increase. These risks lower the value of the mean, while the median is less
a¤ected.
Finally, the results seem robust to the urban - rural distinction. A few remarks
have to be made however. While in the whole sample as well as in the urban
subsample, the coe¢ cients of the birth order dummies are ordered in the expected
way (c1 < c2 < c3 < 0), this is not the case in the rural subsample. In the latter,
0 > c1 > c2: although the rst born is less educated than a fourth or later born,
the second born seems to be in the worst position in rural areas. The magnitude
of the wealth e¤ect on birth order also seems stronger there.
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4.2 Robustness checks
Table 3 and 4 present coe¢ cient estimates of equations with alternative measures
of the birth order, namely the absolute and relative birth orders. In these regres-
sions, the coe¢ cients of birth order are positive: as the order of birth increases (for
instance from the rst born to the second born), the educational zscore increases.
The interaction term between birth order and wealth has an opposite e¤ect, con-
rming our previous results. Regarding gender, it seems to have an impact, but
only in rural areas.
Another issue that was pointed out in our introduction to the data is that if
some children have migrated before the date of the survey, our measure of birth
order might be awed. Table 5 presents coe¢ cient estimates of equation (M1)
after exclusion of households in which there has been a migration for the last ve
years. Results are very robust to this subsampling procedure.
We also look at the robustness of our results to changes in the sample based
on fertility characteristics. More precisely, we do the regressions on subsamples
where the head of the household is at most 40 years of age, and also where he is at
least 50. While in the rst case, fertility need not be fully accomplished, it could
be considered as xed in the second. The fact that results are extremely similar in
both subsamples should be a good sign that fertility is not an issue in our analysis.
Finally, we also use alternative measures of wealth: estimated expenditures per
capita, value of land owned, housing expenditures,...
5 Concluding remarks
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the role of birth order in the household
allocation of work and schooling across children in developing countries. Our sim-
ple model shows that unless the household is su¢ ciently wealthy so that it is not
credit constrained, the pressure on resources at the time when only the rst born
child is able to work leads parents to invest less in the education of the rst born.
This result is robust to the introduction of various extensions. One example is the
possibility that adolescent -potentially working- children coexist in the household
for one period in a model where children stay three periods (with two productive
periods) in the household instead of two. The introduction of bequests that might
relax inequalities between children does not change our result neither. Our empir-
ical results conrm that earlier born children receive less education. Furthermore,
we nd that wealthier households do not make use of birth order to discriminate
between childrens education levels than poor ones. These results are robust to
various measures of the birth order.
Finally, the literature on the impact of birth order has up to now provided conict-
ing conclusions. Until recently, the common view was that earlier born children
receive more education that their younger siblings. A new trend suggests the op-
posite conclusion. In this paper, we bring some new insights to this discussion by
highlighting the impact of parental wealth. We show that poor households provide
their elder children with less education, while richer families do not discriminate.
Our empirical results suggest that the richest parents might even favor the educa-
tion of the earlier born. This result might provide a link between the conicting
11
trends in this literature.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Absolute Birth Order 2.1 1.2 1 8 6452
Relative Birth Order 0.33 0.34 0 1 6452
Age 10.71 3.47 6 18 6452
Gender (Male=1) 0.51 6452
Education (years) 3.31 2.9 0 14 6452
Z-score 0.02 0.75 -2 4.5 6452
Firstborn (rstborn=1) 0.4 6452
Second born (Second born=1) 0.3 6452
Third born (Third born=1) 0.17 6452
Number of younger brothers 1.16 1.1 0 7 6452
Number of younger sisters 1.14 1.12 0 7 6452
Household characteristics
Number of children 3.77 1.62 2 13 2560
Expenditures p. cap. (100,000 CFA) 3.03 4.73 0.18 171.05 2560
Household wealth indicator 2.03 0.54 0 3.98 2546
Wealth (POOR=1) 0.35 2560
The number of observations related to households characteristics is the number of
households in the sample. The mean of a dummy variable represents a proportion.
The dummy poor is dened according to the poverty line of the country.
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Table 2: Regression results with birth order dummies.
Rural Urban All sample
1 2 3
Firstborn (rstborn=1) -0.569 -0.567 -0.616
(1.70)* (2.77)*** (3.80)***
Second born (Second born=1) -0.710 -0.477 -0.509
(2.50)** (2.74)*** (3.72)***
Third born (Third born=1) -0.394 -0.283 -0.310
(1.50) (1.81)* (2.57)**
Firstborn * Wealth 0.440 0.248 0.320
(3.06)*** (4.13)*** (6.38)***
Second born * Wealth 0.521 0.210 0.269
(3.76)*** (3.46)*** (5.35)***
Third born * Wealth 0.286 0.123 0.161
(1.91)* (1.92)* (3.05)***
Firstborn * Gender 0.123 0.018 0.065
(1.04) (0.24) (1.00)
Second born * Gender 0.092 0.030 0.066
(0.89) (0.44) (1.14)
Third born * Gender 0.006 -0.036 -0.009
(0.06) (0.50) (0.15)
Gender (Male=1) 0.006 0.011 -0.001
(0.06) (0.17) (0.01)
# of younger brothers 0.056 0.084 0.074
(0.85) (1.77)* (1.90)*
# of younger sisters -0.011 0.036 0.019
(0.15) (0.80) (0.51)
age8 -0.400 -0.285 -0.327
(8.04)*** (8.36)*** (11.55)***
age10 -0.685 -0.315 -0.447
(10.18)*** (6.95)*** (11.85)***
age13 -0.654 -0.297 -0.422
(7.20)*** (4.90)*** (8.40)***
age15 -0.788 -0.453 -0.567
(7.05)*** (5.97)*** (9.06)***
Constant -0.084 0.346 0.208
(1.11) (7.59)*** (5.39)***
Observations 2313 4099 6412
Number of households 932 1614 2546
R-squared 0.18 0.06 0.10
Figures between parentheses indicate t-statistics. *, ** and *** indicate that variable is
signicant respectively at 10%, 5% and 1%.
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Table 3: Regression results with the absolute birth order.
Rural Urban All sample
1 2 3
Absolute BO 0.137 0.088 0.121
(2.56)** (2.49)** (4.33)***
Absolute BO * Wealth -0.114 -0.066 -0.086
(3.27)*** (4.57)*** (7.13)***
Gender (Male=1) 0.192 0.034 0.092
(2.98)*** (0.78) (2.49)**
Absolute BO * Sex -0.063 -0.017 -0.035
(2.34)** (0.95) (2.27)**
age8 -0.403 -0.289 -0.329
(8.18)*** (8.54)*** (11.70)***
age10 -0.683 -0.323 -0.451
(10.42)*** (7.21)*** (12.16)***
age13 -0.654 -0.310 -0.430
(7.36)*** (5.20)*** (8.70)***
age15 -0.791 -0.474 -0.583
(7.31)*** (6.37)*** (9.57)***
Constant 0.218 0.590 0.451
(1.91)* (7.54)*** (7.07)***
Observations 2313 4099 6412
Number of households 932 1614 2546
R-squared 0.17 0.06 0.10
Figures between parentheses indicate t-statistics. *, ** and *** indicate that variable is
signicant respectively at 10%, 5% and 1%.
Table 4: Regression results with the relative birth order.
Rural Urban All sample
Relative BO 0.900 * 0.223 0.523 ***
Relative BO * Sex -0.146 0.027 -0.032
Relative BO * Wealth -0.387 -0.134 *** -0.235 ***
Gender (Male=1) 0.129 *** 0.010 0.049 *
# of younger boys sibling 0.123 *** 0.064 ** 0.084 ***
# of younger girls sibling 0.053 0.009 0.026
age8 -0.381 *** -0.291 *** -0.322 ***
age10 -0.633 *** -0.323 *** -0.434 ***
age13 -0.576 *** -0.306 *** -0.399 ***
age15 -0.692 *** -0.467 *** -0.542 ***
Constant -0.224 * 0.414 *** 0.186 ***
Observations 2313 4099 6412
Number of households 932 1614 2546
R-squared 0.16 0.06 0.09
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Table 5: Robustness checks: migration and fertility controls.
No migration Head over 50 Head under 40
Firstborn -0.646 *** -0.732 *** -0.692 **
Second born -0.571 *** -0.651 *** -0.640 ***
Third born -0.368 *** -0.537 ** -0.249
Firstborn * Wealth 0.347 *** 0.348 *** 0.376 ***
Second born * Wealth 0.304 *** 0.346 *** 0.318 ***
Third born * Wealth 0.196 *** 0.278 ** 0.136
Firstborn * Gender 0.056 0.109 -0.041
Second born * Gender 0.057 0.040 0.086
Third born * Gender 0.008 0.015 -0.097
Gender (Male=1) 0.044 -0.054 0.101
# of younger boys sibling 0.088 * 0.105 * 0.090
# of younger girls sibling 0.026 0.078 -0.007
age8 -0.348 *** -0.414 *** -0.300 ***
age10 -0.493 *** -0.620 *** -0.466 ***
age13 -0.492 *** -0.628 *** -0.385 ***
age15 -0.630 *** -0.726 *** -0.558 ***
Constant 0.140 *** 0.196 ** 0.162 ***
Observations 4390 1422 2999
Number of households 1728 492 1363
R-squared 0.11 0.13 0.13
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